




Whether an arbitration agreement signed by a company member of a group of
companies is also binding upon and entitles other nonsignatory members of that
group of companies, remains an open question. Some arbitral awards' and judg-
ments of state courts2 rendered with respect to this problem have answered the
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1993).
1. A long line of arbitral awards rendered by arbitral tribunals acting under the auspices of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris hold a company member of a group of companies
liable under an arbitration agreement signed by another member company belonging to the same
group. See ICCmatter no. 1434, award of 1975, 103 J. Du DROIT INT'L 978-80 (1976) with annotation
by Y. Derains [hereinafter ICC matter no. 1434]. See also the comments upon this case by Jan
Paulsson, Third World Participation in International Investment Arbitration, 2 ICSID REv. FOREIGN
INv. L.J. 19, 25-26 (1987); ICC matter no. 2375, award of 1975, 103 J. Du DROIT INT'L 973-74
(1976) with annotation by Y. Derains [hereinafter ICC matter no. 2375]; ICC matter no. 4131, award
of 1982, 110 J. Du DROIT INT'L 899 (1983) with annotation by Y. Derains [hereinafter ICC matter
no. 4131], reprinted in 1984 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 137; with respect to a slightly different factual
situation, see also ICC matter no. 3493, award of March 11th, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 752, 761-67 (1983);
ICC matter no. 5103, award of 1988, 115 J. Du DROIT INT'L 1206 (1988) with annotation by G.A.
Alvarez [hereinafter ICC matter no. 5103]; ICC matter no. 5730, award of 1988, 117 J. DU DROIT
INT'L 1029 (1990) with annotation by Y. Derains [hereinafter ICC matter no. 5730]; ICC matter no.
6519, award of 1991, 118 J. Du DROIT INT'L 1065 (1991) with annotation by Y. Derains [hereinafter
ICC matter no. 6519]. See also award no. 1510 of Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc., New York,
of November 28th, 1980, in 7 Y.B. COM. Air. 151 (1982) [hereinafter award no. 1510].
2. In the following ICC awards it was denied that, under the circumstances there prevailing,
the arbitration agreement signed by a company member of a group of companies could be binding
upon other members of that group. See ICC matter no. 4402, award of March 17th, 1983, reprinted
in SIGVARD JARVIN & YVES DERAINS, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974-1985, RECUEIL
DES SENTENCES ARBITRAES DE LA CCI 1974-1985, at 153-57 (1990) [hereinafter ICC matter no.
4402]; ICC matter no. 4504, awards of 1985/86, 113 J. DU DROIT INT'L 1118 (1986) with annotation
by S. Jarvin [hereinafter ICC matter no 4504]; ICC matter no. 4972, award of 1989, 116 J. DU DROIT
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question positively. Other arbitral awards3 and judgments of state courts4 have
denied any binding effect of, and any entitlement flowing from, an arbitration
agreement signed by only one member of a group of companies on other members
of such group. In doctrine5 the answer to this problem is as controversial as it is
in the dicta of arbitral tribunals and state courts.
Commentators have at an early stage of the discussion abundantly expounded
on this subject.6 The intent of this article is to show that there is a whole series
of different situations in which this problem can arise and that those different
situations require the use of rather diverse doctrinal tools that lead to a variety
of solutions.
In terms of facts, one has to differentiate between three basic situations:
(1) A parent company or an individual person7 holding the shares of and direct-
INT'L 1100 (1989) with annotation by G.A. Alvarez [hereinafter ICC matter no. 4972]; ICC matter
no. 5721, award of 1990, 117 J. Du DROIT INT'L 1019 (1990) with annotation by Y. Derains
[hereinafter ICC matter no. 5721].
3. See Roussel-Uclafv. Searle & Co., [ 1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 231,232, reprinted in 4 Y.B. COM.
Au. 317 (320); Judgment of Oct. 21, 1983, Cour d'Appel de Paris, 1986 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 98
(Fr.) with annotation by A. Chapelle; Judgment of Nov. 26, 1986, Cour d'Appel de Pau, 1988 REVUE
DE L'ARBITRAGE 153 (Fr.); Dighello v. Busconi, 673 F. Supp. 85, 88-90 (D. Conn. 1987).
4. As to Swiss (and Dutch) courts, see Judgment of May 6, 1976, Tribunal f&lral suisse, ATF
102 Ia 582 (Switz.); unpublished Judgment of Oct. 10, 1979, Tribunal f&Idral suisse (Switz.), cited
by BERNARD DUTOIT ET AL., RIPERTOIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVI SUISSE 259 (1982), and
also by P. JOUDON, COMMENTAIRE DU CONCORDAT SUISSE SUR L'ARITRAGE 121, art. 4 n.34 (1984)
(see also infra note 21). With respect to a slightly different factual situation, see Judgment of July
12, 1984, Cour d'Appel de Paris, 1986 REvuE DE L'ARBITRAGE 75 (Fr); Judgment of Jan. 6, 1987,
Cour de cassation, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 469 (Fr.), reprinted in 13 Y.B. COM. ARB. 152; Judgment
of July 12, 1984, Arrondissementsrechtbank [District Court of Amsterdam], 10 Y.B. COM. ARB. 487
(1985). See also Judgment of Mar. 20, 1984, Tribunal fMdral suisse, ATF 110 II 54 (Switz.). As
to the courts of the United States, see Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co. v. Rosseel N.V., 609
F. Supp. 75, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), reprinted in 12 Y.B. COM. Ann. 532, 535 (1987); Coastal
States Trading, Inc. v. Zenith Navigation S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
5. Some authors support the tendencies of arbitral tribunals and state courts to extend the binding
effects of arbitration agreements upon other companies of the same group. See, e.g., Y. Derains
& S. Schaf, Clauses d'Arbitrages et Groupes de Socidtds, 1985 REVUE DU DROIT DES AFFAIREs
INTERNATIONALES 231; A. Chapelle, Rapport Gdndral sur l'arbitrage et les Tiers: II. -Le Droit des
Personnes Morales (Groupes de Socidtds; Interventions d'Etat), 1988 REvuE DE L'ARBITRAGE 475;
T. Laugier, L'Arbitrage Multipartite a l'Epreuve des Droits Nationaux, 1989 REVUE DU DROIT
DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES 985. Other authors are rather cautious and reluctant. See, e.g., I.
Fadlalah, Clauses d'Arbitrage et Groupes de Socitds, TRAVAUX DU COMITA FRtANIAIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIv9, ANNES 1984-1985, at 105 (1987) [hereinafter TtAVAUX 1984-1985]; P.
Leboulanger, Etat, Politique et Arbitrage-l'Affaire du Plateau des Pyramides, 1986 REVUE DE
L'ARBITRAGE 3; ADAM SAMUEL, JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION: A STUDY OF BELGIAN, DUTCH, ENGLISH, FRENCH, SWEDISH, SWISS, U.S. AND WEST
GERMAN LAW 102-06 (1989); see also LAURENCE CRIo ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION 95-100 (2d ed. 1990)
6. See, e.g., P. Lalive, Arbitrage international et ordre publique suisse-Une surprenante
dofcision du Tribunal Fiddral, L 'arret SGTM v. Bangladesh, 97 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR SCHWEIZERISCHES
RECHT 529 (1978); see also The First "World Bank" Arbitration (Holiday Inn v. Marocco)-Some
Legal Problems, 51 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 123, 137-55 (1980).
7. If the notion of "parent company" is mentioned in this article, it will also comprise the
individual owner of a parent company, that is a Mr. X or Mrs. X.
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ing one or more subsidiaries, possibly with one or more subsidiaries of further
degrees, signs an arbitration agreement. Here the question may arise whether the
subsidiaries or sub-subsidiaries, though nonsignatories to the arbitration
agreement, may be sued. If they may be sued, the question arises under what
circumstances, together with their parent company or companies8 or even alone,
based on the above-mentioned arbitration agreement. Alternatively, the question
may be whether such a subsidiary or sub-subsidiary may avail itself of the
agreement in suing the partner of that agreement before the arbitral tribunal
therein appointed, either in conjunction with its parent company or by itself. In
this factual context, the powers of a holding company have to be defined to
obligate and to entitle not only itself but also the subsidiaries or sub-subsidiaries
of its group by a signature attached only by itself to an arbitration agreement. 9
(2) The same question has to be answered in the reverse situation. A subsidiary
or a sub-subsidiary member of a group of companies is the sole signatory of an
arbitration agreement that is later invoked either by the partner to such arbitration
agreement when suing the parent company or companies of the subsidiary or by the
parent company itself when suing the partner of the arbitration agreement before
the arbitral tribunal therein appointed. In this factual context the rights and duties
of a parent company [that derive from an arbitration agreement signed not by itself,
but by a subsidiary or sub-subsidiary of its group] have to be determined.'°
(3) Finally, a third factual context has to be taken into consideration. A sister
company signs an arbitration agreement. Again, the question may be raised
whether and under what circumstances such an arbitration agreement obligates
and entitles other affiliated companies belonging to the same group either to be
sued before the arbitral tribunal by the partner to the arbitration agreement or to
introduce themselves as claimants in a request for arbitration against the partner
of the arbitration agreement as the defendant. In practice, however, this situation
seems to occur less frequently."
II. Recent Developments
The discussion of the general problem under consideration here has recently
evolved in different directions. First, arbitrators acting under the auspices of the
8. Id.
9. This was the factual context upon which the following arbitral awards and the following
judgments of state courts had to be decided: in ICC matter no. 1434, supra note 1; ICC matter no.
2375, supra note 1; ICC matter no. 4402, supra note 2; ICC matter no. 6519, supra note 1; ICC
matter no. 4504, supra note 2; ICC no. 4972, supra note 2; Roussel-Uclaf v. Searle & Co., [1978]
1 Lloyd's Rep. 231, 232 (Eng. Ch.).
10. This was the factual context upon which the following arbitral awards and judgments that
state courts had to decide: ICC matter no. 4131, supra note 1; ICC matter no. 5730, supra note 1;
ICC matter no 5721, supra note 2; Judgment of Oct. 21, 1983, Cour d'Appel de Paris, supra note
3; Judgment of Nov. 26, 1986, Cour d'Appel de Pau, supra note 3.
11. This was the factual context upon which the following arbitral awards and the following
judgments of state courts had to decide: ICC matter no. 4131, supra note 1; award no. 1510, supra
note 1; Judgment of Oct. 21, 1983, Cour d'Appel de Paris, supra note 3.
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ICC show a strong tendency to recognize that an arbitration agreement signed by
a company belonging to a group of companies obligates and entitles the other
member companies of such group if that agreement fulfills certain minimum
requirements. 12 This tendency is strongest among the advocates of the lex mercato-
ria. 13 These advocates have developed "group of companies" doctrine, 14 which
is clearly and unequivocally reflected in some dicta in arbitral awards. In a famous
award, three highly respected international arbitrators stated:
Considering that a group of companies, in spite of the separate juristic personality of
each company belonging to the group, possesses a unique economic reality of which the
Arbitral Tribunal has to take account when it decides upon its jurisdiction in applying
article 13 (version of 1955) or article 8 (version of 1975) of the Rules of Arbitration
of the I.C.C.;
Considering, in particular, that the arbitration clause which has been expressly ac-
cepted by certain companies of the group, has to bind the other companies which,
through the roles played by them during the conclusion, execution or termination of the
contracts with such clauses, appear, pursuant to the common intention of the parties to
the procedure, to have been real parties to these contracts or to have been affected, in
the first line, by them and by the litigations possibly arising out of them;
Considering that in this sense arbitral tribunals under the auspices of the I.C.C.
have already pronounced themselves . . .; that the decisions of these tribunals are
progressively constituting a body of legal precedents of which it is necessary to take
account because these precedents derive the consequences from economic reality and
because they are consonant with the needs of the international commerce which have
to be met by specific rules of international arbitration progressively elaborated.' 5
In another award rendered about six years later the new "group of companies"
theory was summarized as follows:
When concluding, performing, nonperforming and renegotiating their contractual rela-
tions with [defendants], the three claimant companies appear, pursuant to the common
intention of all parties engaged in the procedure, to have been real parties to all the
contracts. In its formulation and in its spirit, this analysis is based on a remarkable and
approved tendency of arbitral rulings favoring acknowledgement, under those circum-
stances, of the unity of the group.. . . The security of international commercial relations
requires that account should be taken of its economic reality and that all the companies
of the group should be held liable one for all and all for one for the debts of which they
either directly or indirectly have profited at this occasion.16
The limits inherent to the "group of companies" doctrine have, however, been
clearly pointed out in a recent award where the arbitral tribunal stated:
12. See the arbitral awards, cited supra note 1 and note 3.
13. It has been, among others, particularly B. Goldman and Y. Derains who have supported this
doctrine. See, e.g., the contributions by B. Goldman to a scholarly discussion reported in TRAVAUX
1984-1985, supra note 5, at 125-27, and the annotations to arbitral awards by Y. Derains, supra note
1 and 2; see also Derains & Schaf, supra note 5.
14. In French, this doctrine has been baptized "thiorie de la roalitd economique du groupe" or
"theorie de l'uniti du groupe." See, e.g., S. Jarvin in an annotation to the award rendered in ICC
matter no. 4504, supra note 2, at 1130.
15. ICC matter no. 4131, supra note 1, at 904 [translation by the author]. The three arbitrators
were: Prof. Pieter Sanders (Pres.), Prof. Berthold Goldman, Prof. Michel Vasseur.
16. ICC matter no. 5103, supra note 1, at 1212 [translation by the author].
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In summary, the belonging of two companies to the same group or the domination by
one shareholder never in itself constitutes a sufficient reason justifying, in full, the
piercing of the corporate veil. When, however, a company or an individual person
appears to have been the pivot of the contractual relations in a particular transaction,
it is appropriate to examine with care whether the independence of the parties must not,
exceptionally, be disregarded giving way to a general judgment. One will accept such
an exception when it appears that a confusion has been maintained by the group or by
the majority shareholder.17
Second, the "group of companies" theory, developed notably by arbitral tribu-
nals under the auspices of the ICC, has had its repercussions on the dicta of French
courts, which seem inclined to follow the new theory as evidenced by a judgment
of the Cour d'Appel de Pau rendered in 1986, a headnote of which states:
It is admitted in law that an arbitration clause which has been accepted by certain
companies of a group, has to bind the other companies which, through the role played
by them during the conclusion, performance or termination of the contracts containing
said clauses, appear, pursuant to the common intention of all the parties in the procedure,
to have been real parties to these contracts or as having been affected, in the first line,
by them and by the litigations possibly arising out of them."'"
Third, other jurisdictions seem to be more reluctant to follow the new doctrinal
approach under which affiliated companies belonging to the same group of compa-
nies may be treated as a unit, provided certain preconditions have been met. For
example, in Switzerland' 9 some Swiss legal writers"' seem to prefer a more
cautious approach to the extension of the effects of an arbitration agreement
upon affiliated companies or upon the owner of a company. To illustrate this
phenomenon, two examples follow: one stemming from the field of arbitral juris-
diction, the other from state jurisdiction.
(1) An arbitral tribunal presided over by an eminent Swiss international lawyer"
17. ICC matter no. 5721, supra note 2 at 1024 (emphasis added) [translation by the author].
18. Judgment of Nov. 26, 1986, Cour d'Appel de Pau [translation by the author]; see also
Judgment of Oct. 21, 1983, Cour d'Appel de Paris, supra note 3.
19. See Judgment of May 6, 1976, Tribunal f16dral suisse, supra note 4; unpublished Judgment
of Oct. 10, 1979, Tribunal fd6ral suisse, supra note 4; Judgment of Mar. 20, 1984, Tribunal f&16ral
suisse, supra note 4.
20. See, e.g., JOLIDON, supra note 4. Jolidon refers to the decision of a state court in the Canton
Vaud and to a judgment rendered, on October 10th, 1979, by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. He
also comments upon these decisions as follows:
The cantonal court of Vaud had admitted, with the arbitrators, that the person who was the animator of a group
of companies upon which he had his grip, could "by his only signature... assume all the liabilities stipulated
in the respective contract and affecting the whole of the group," that "in view of the permeability and interlocking
of companies dominated by a single person, one can admit that (the latter) has rendered liable all the companies
of his group" and that, consequently, all the companies of the group "could be drawn into the arbitral procedure'"
S.... It is justified that the Federal Court has set aside that award .. . in pointing out that the respective group
did not have a juristic personality and that the question to be solved in this matter is to know whether the person
who animated this group "effectively had the power to render liable all the companies and to sign, in this name,
an arbitration clause .... Correspondingly, the question which has been raised is to know whether, in view of
the arbitration agreement concluded with the parent company, the effects of that agreement extend also to the
subsidiaries .... "A categorically negative answer has to be given in the framework of the Intercantonal Arbitration
Convention, no matter how the wording of the arbitration agreement would be, provided that the subsidiaries are
distinct legal personalities and that their representatives have not, in such quality, signed or ratified the agreement
mentioned. [Translation by the author.]
21. Prof. Frank Vischer from Basle University. His co-arbitrators were W. Owen and G.W.
Haight.
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had to decide whether a French company S.D., which was the parent company
of another French company, F. D., had become bound by an arbitration agreement
that had been signed not by the parent company itself but only by its subsidiary
F.D. In its award,22 the arbitral tribunal referred neither to the lex mercatoria,
nor to international trade usages, nor to the necessities of international trade, nor
to the above-mentioned arbitral jurisprudence of ICC arbitral tribunals, which
had already developed their "group of companies" doctrine at the time when the
award was rendered. In lieu of this approach, the arbitral tribunal simply recurred
to the principles of Swiss domestic law, by which the arbitral tribunal thought the
arbitration agreement was governed.23
In a rather sober, down-to-earth manner, the arbitral tribunal differentiated the
specific doctrinal problem here at stake, that is the doubtful question whether the
subsidiary F.D. had a specific power of authority when signing the arbitration
agreement to represent its parent company S.D. The panel explained:
The seat of this Arbitral Tribunal is Geneva (Switzerland); the Canton of Geneva has
ratified the Swiss Intercantonial Arbitration Convention; article 6 of this Convention is
mandatory and provides for a written document containing either a compromise or an
arbitration qlause. This written document has to fulfill the requirements of articles 13
ff. of the Swiss Code of Obligations. If those are not complied with, none may be forced
to submit a dispute to an Arbitral Tribunal.. . . Nobody, even a non-Swiss citizen, can
without his consent be deprived of his own natural judge (Art. 58 of the Constitution).
Neither party contends that S.D. signed the Operating Agreement with the actual
arbitration clause. It is not contested either that Mr. X who signed the Operating
Agreement on behalf of F.D., acted only for the subsidiary and not for the mother
company. It becomes clear from the introduction of the Operating Agreement that only
F.D. is a party to it. Claimants do not contend that Mr. X was acting on S.D. 's behalf
with special power of attorney as a member of S.D. 's board of directors. Mr. X therefore
had only the power to bind F. D., as he was acting in the Operating Agreement expressly
as chairman of F.D.; any other company could not be committed by his signature. 24
The decisive legal issue involved here, the power of authority, could not have
been determined and solved in a more simple and convincing manner than it has
been done in the above-mentioned award.
(2) Such a conservative approach to our problem has manifested itself also in
the well-known decision rendered by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in the
SGTM v. Bangladesh case,25 a decision which has, with good reason, been widely
criticized.26
The judgment by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court was preceded by the award
of an arbitral tribunal27 that had to make a decision based upon the following facts:
A state-owned corporation was sued before an arbitral tribunal by its contractual
22. ICC matter no. 4402, supra note 2.
23. Id. at 154-55.
24. Id. at 155-56.
25. Judgment of May 6, 1976, Tribunal f&lral suisse, supra note 4.
26. Lalive, supra note 6; see also SAMUEL, supra note 5, at 105.
27. ICC matter no. 1803, Award of 1972, in 5 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 177, 182-85 (1980).
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partner for the payment of certain contractual services it had received. After the
arbitral proceedings had commenced, the state that owned the corporation simply
dissolved it. Thereupon the contractual partner also introduced a request for
arbitration against the respective state. The arbitral tribunal admitted such joinder,
arguing that to do otherwise would be contrary to international public policy. The
Swiss Federal Supreme Court annulled this award, holding that an entity like the
foreign state in question here, which had not signed an arbitration agreement,
could not be the defendant in arbitration proceedings instituted on the basis of
such an agreement. In its judgment, the Swiss Supreme Court expounded:
[O]ne has to know only whether one can oblige the Popular Republic of Bangladesh
• . .to submit to an arbitration clause contained in this contract to which that Republic
has from the start and constantly declined to submit itself. In the absence of a convention
* . .and in the absence of a universal succession or of special legal provisions...
such a refusal cannot be considered as being incompatible with the public policy of
Switzerland. No mandatory rule and no well-established rule of the Swiss public policy
obliges anybody to submit himself, against his will, to an arbitral procedure .... The
applicant invokes also, in addition to the Swiss public policy, the "international public
policy," which is said also to impede the application, in this instance, of the ordinances
of Bangladesh .... One cannot see how this "international public policy" would inhibit
the application of foreign law more, or in a different manner, than this would be achieved
through the reservation of the swiss public policy ......
M. The Fundamental Principles Governing the Problem Here Under
Examination
On a national level, the fundamental principles under consideration have been
very clearly spelled out in the opinion of a United States federal court which
states: "Ordinary contract and agency principles determine which parties are
bound by an arbitration agreement, and parties can become contractually bound
absent their signatures. ' 29
On an international level, the situation is more complicated. Here the fundamen-
tal principles from which a solution of our problem must derive are partly disputed
in the international legal community. These principles are only partly compatible
with each other, and in other respects they are dialectically in opposition to each
other. These principles may be enumerated as follows:
(1) All arbitration agreements are governed by a specific national law and not
by the lex mercatoria. (For example, see article 8 of the ICC Arbitration
Rules).
(2) The arbitration agreement does not necessarily have to be governed by the
same substantive law as the main contract, to which it is attached. The
28. Id. at 582 [translation by the author].
29. Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Rosseel, N.V., 609 F. Supp. 75,78 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
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parties have the autonomy to choose a law different from the proper law
of the contract to govern their arbitration agreement.
(3) Arbitration agreements have to be construed restrictively.
(4) A written form is often prescribed for arbitration agreements.
(5) Arbitration agreements are also governed by the principle of privity of
contract, which in the present context means that third parties extraneous
to the arbitration agreement cannot become parties to it unless all parties
to the agreement approve of such expansion.
(6) An exception to such privity of contract exists wherever the parties to an
arbitration agreement have stipulated that a third-party extraneous to the
agreement shall as a beneficiary of their agreement be entitled to introduce
a request for arbitration against one (or both) of them.
(7) The rules of representation have to be properly applied, which means in
the present context, that the company or the individual owner of a company,
when signing an arbitration agreement, must under certain circumstances
be deemed to have acted on behalf of and in the name of a subsidiary or
any other affiliated company belonging to the same group.
(8) Under the doctrine of estoppel (i) the individual owner of a company, the
director of a company, or any company member of a group who have not
signed an arbitration agreement must still be held to be precluded from
alleging that they are not bound by such an arbitration agreement and that
they, therefore, cannot be sued upon said agreement; and (ii) the other
party to the arbitration agreement, which has duly signed such agreement,
must be deemed to be precluded from alleging that a party who has not
signed the agreement cannot participate as a claimant in arbitration proceed-
ings instituted against it upon said agreement.
The first five principles heretofore enunciated are dealt with in part IV. The
construct of the third-party beneficiary (principle 6) is examined in part V, and
the problems of representation (principle 7) and the effect of the doctrine of
estoppel (principle 8) are the subject of our research in parts VI and VII.
IV. Proper Law, Autonomy, Interpretation, Form, and Privity of an
Arbitration Agreement
An arbitration agreement is a contract. Whether a company that has not signed
the agreement, yet is a party to the contract or must at least be deemed to be a
party to it, is a question to be determined, though not exclusively, by the proper
law of the contract. The search for the proper law of the arbitration agreement,
therefore, must be the starting point of any analysis of our problem.
Some arbitral awards30 and some doctrinal writers 3' have argued that the proper
30. See, e.g., ICC matter no. 4131, supra note 1, at 900; see also Judgment of Oct. 21, 1983,
Cour d'Appel de Paris, supra note 3, at 100, 101, with annotation by A. Chapelle at 104-06.
31. See, e.g., Y. Derains in the annotation to ICC matter no. 4131, supra note 1, at 905-06.
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law of arbitration agreements providing for arbitral proceedings under the ICC
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration is article 8 of those Rules. This article
constitutes an autonomous regulation of the agreement. Other awards32 and doc-
trinal writers33 have, in a similar fashion, advanced the thesis that the so-called
lex mercatoria governs arbitration agreements. For those arbitrators and authors,
however, who have doubts about the existence of the lex mercatoria, an arbitration
agreement must be subject to one or the other national law like a contract of any
other kind. 34 The dispute between the advocates and the opponents of the lex
mercatoria is not discussed in the present context. This author does not believe
in the existence of the lex mercatoria as a system of law susceptible to governing
contracts on an a-national level. For those who join this author in not following
the lex mercatoria doctrine, the question of which national law is called upon to
govern an arbitration agreement must be addressed.
Pursuant to the principle of the autonomy of an arbitration agreement, such an
agreement does not necessarily have to be governed by the same substantive law
as the main contract to which it is attached. This principle of conflict of laws
seems to be almost universally recognized.35 Therefore, for an arbitral tribunal
to search for the proper law of the main contract is immaterial.
Furthermore, an arbitral tribunal is generally not bound by any rule of a specific
national system of conflict of laws. Arbitral tribunals, notably those that act under
the auspices of an arbitral institution, are commonly held to have a discretion in
the choice of the specific conflict of laws rule they will apply.36
Consequently our search for the proper law of the arbitration agreement has
to proceed from the assumption that the arbitral tribunal, when determining the
proper law of the arbitration agreement, may apply the conflict of laws rule it
deems most appropriate.
Another principle of law that is firmly established in most national jurisdictions
requires that arbitration agreements be strictly interpreted. By an arbitration
32. See, e.g., ICC matter no. 5721, supra note 2, at 1023. See also Judgment of Nov. 26, 1986,
Cour d'Appel de Pau, supra note 3, at 156, with annotation by A. Chapelle at 159.
33. See, e.g., Y. Derains in an annotation to ICCmatter no. 5721, supra note 2, at 1028; Derains
& Schaf, supra note 5, at 236-38; T. Laugier, supra note 5, at 986-88.
34. See, e.g., ICC matter no. 5730, supra note 1, at 1032-34; ICC matter no. 4504, supra note
2, at 1119; see also P. Mayer in a contribution to a scholarly discussion, 1988 REVUE DE L'ARBITAGE
499.
35. See 2 JEAN ROBERT & THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE FRENCH LAW OF ARBITRATION § 2-041
(1983); ALAN REOFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 132-34 (1986); P. SCHLOSSER, DAS RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATEN SCHIEDS-
GERICHTSBARKEIT 291 (2d ed. 1989).
36. See Redfern & Hunter, supra note 35, at 95-97; CRAio, supra note 5, at 283-87. See also
the compilation of awards, rulings of courts, and doctrinal writers in 0. Sandrock, Die Fortbildung des
materiellen Rechts durch die Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, in RECHTSFORTBILDUNG DURCH
INTERNATIONALE SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 60 (K.-H. B6kstiegel ed. 1989); 0. Sandrock, Welches
Kollisionrecht hat ein Internationales Schiedsgericht Anzuwenden, 1992 RECHT DER INTERNATIO-
NALEN WIRTSCHAFT 785.
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agreement, a contractual partner is, in the language of an impressive arbitral
award heretofore cited,37 "deprived of his own natural judge." 38 Although the
institution and practice of international arbitration has, in the course of the last
decades, been increasingly recognized as a legitimate and adequate means of
solving international business disputes, and although this recognition seems to be
established in almost all countries belonging to the industrialized world, the theory
that those who have not agreed to arbitration may be sued under arbitration
agreements to which they have not been signatories or that those who have not by
agreement been accepted as partners to arbitration agreements would be entitled to
participate as claimants in such proceedings must be discredited as a matter of
principle. The principle of strict interpretation of arbitration proceedings must,
therefore, be scrupulously respected.39
The same is true of the form requirement established by some national jurisdic-
tions and by some international conventions. This requirement serves the same
ends as the principles of strict interpretation, namely to prevent persons extraneous
to an arbitration from participating in it either as defendants or as claimants. Its
purpose is also to ensure unequivocal evidence on who is a party to an arbitration
agreement and who is noti4
Lastly, both the principles of strict interpretation and the form requirement are
destined to guarantee that privity of contract prevails. Privity of contract can be
modified, however, by three countervailing sets of rules: the rules on third-party
beneficiaries, the rules on representation, and the rules on estoppel.
A natural person or a company that did not sign an arbitration agreement might
yet derive from the agreement a power to introduce a request for arbitration
against one (or both) of the contractual partners if it appears as a third-party
beneficiary to the agreement."' Such person or company may be bound or entitled
by an arbitration agreement if somebody invested with a power of authority has
signed the agreement on its behalf and in its name. 42 Finally, a natural person or
a company that did not sign an arbitration agreement may be precluded under the
applicable national rules of estoppel from alleging that it is not party to the
agreement. Hence, it may be bound and entitled to appear either as a defendant
or as a claimant in the ensuing arbitration proceedings.43
37. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
38. See ICC arbitration matter no. 4402 (Prof. Frank Vischer), supra note 2.
39. This principle has been discussed, in the present context, by various doctrinal writers. See,
e.g., Y. Derains in his annotations to the award in ICC matters no. 1434, supra note 1, at 982-83;
Chapelle, supra note 5, at 480-81. See also ICC matter no. 2138, 102 J. Du DROIT INT'L 934 (1975)
which applies this principle to arbitration agreements in general.
40. The problem of form has been discussed, in the present context, in a few arbitral awards and
by some doctrinal writers. See ICC matter no. 5730, supra note 1, at 1035; ICC matter no. 4504,
supra note 2, at 1120; A. Chapelle, supra note 3, at 108; A. Chapelle, supra note 5, at 478-80; J.
Fadlallah, supra note 5, at 112-14 (Fadlallah engages in an in-depth analysis of the problem).
41. See infra part V.
42. See infra part VI.
43. See infra part VII.
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Thus, the different national rules on third-party beneficiaries, on representa-
tion, and on estoppel will in the last resort resolve the problem under scrutiny in
this article. The different national sets of rules concerning these issues, therefore,
deserve our most thorough attention.
V. The Different National Rules on Third-Party Beneficiaries
The parties to an arbitration agreement may expressly stipulate that not only
shall they themselves be bound and entitled by their agreement, but that third
parties shall also acquire rights and duties thereunder. Thus, a company member
of a group of companies can agree with a contractual partner, that also affiliated
companies shall also be entitled and bound by the arbitration agreement. Conse-
quently, an express agreement overrides the principle of privity of contract. The
third party that has not signed the arbitration agreement becomes a member to it.
As soon as the third party claims rights under the agreement, it will also be bound
by the duties resulting therefrom.
Furthermore, in a few cases it may be feasible to derive from the circumstances
surrounding an arbitration agreement a tacit intention of the parties to make one
or several third parties a beneficiary of the agreement. In the terms of section 302
paragraph (1) of the American Restatement (Second) on the Law of Contracts:
Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise
is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is
appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and ... the circumstances indicate
that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised perfor-
mance.
In the present context the doctrinal construct of the triangular third-party benefi-
ciary would enable an affiliated company to introduce, at least as a claimant, a
request for arbitration against the other party to the agreement. Yet, since only
rights can be conferred, but no duties can be imposed on third parties extraneous
to the agreement without their consent, the construct of the third-party beneficiary
doctrine could never be used to make the third-party affiliated company a mere
obligee under the agreements. In other words, an affiliated nonsignatory company
to the arbitration agreement could, under the doctrine of the third-party benefi-
ciary, never be made a defendant in arbitration proceedings, but could only appear
therein as a claimant. 45 The construct of the third-party beneficiary doctrine,
therefore, is only of limited use in the present context.
The fact that third parties, that is affiliated companies, may acquire as benefici-
aries under an arbitration agreement the right to introduce a request for arbitration
before an arbitral tribunal against one or both of the parties to such agreement has
been fully recognized by the rulings of state courts in a few national jurisdictions.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 439-40 (1981).
45. See also J. L. Goutal in an annotation to the decision rendered by the French Cour de Cassation
cited infra in note 50, at 145-47.
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A U.S. federal court of appeals has stated in a decision rendered in 197246
that a third-party beneficiary under an insurance contract may, by virtue of an
arbitration clause contained in the insurance contract, be forced to pursue his claim
against the insurer through arbitration. In 1924, the former German Reichsgericht
(Supreme Court)4 7 and in 1976, the Bundesgerichtshof(the actual German Federal
Supreme Court)4s handed down similar decisions. 49 Alternatively, in 1985,, o the
French Cour de Cassation declined to endorse the application of the third-party
beneficiary construct to an arbitration agreement. However, this decision has
been severely criticized by a French doctrinal writer." Furthermore, an opposite
trend in French doctrine supports the thesis that a third party may derive from
an arbitration agreement a title to file a request for arbitration against one (or
both) of the parties to an agreement.52
In summary, the construct of the third-party beneficiary will not solve most of
the cases under consideration here. Instead, different national rules on representa-
tion and on estoppel achieve this task.
VI. The Different National Rules on Representation
Whether a parent company, the owner of a company, or a subsidiary is bound
and entitled by the signature that has been attached to an arbitration agreement
by an affiliated company must in the first place be decided by the rules of represen-
tation. 3 Where the signatory company has acted not only on behalf of itself, but
also on behalf of and in the name of other companies affiliated with it, the
arbitration agreement displays effects not only between the immediate signatory
46. Jeans v. Arrow Ins. Co., 494 P.2d 1334, 1337 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
47. See 108 RGZ 374: The right of a third-party to introduce a request for arbitration as a
beneficiary under an arbitration clause was so much regarded as a matter of course by the Reichsgericht
that it was not expressly mentioned in the reasoning of the court. Furthermore, there is a report on
an unpublished decision of the Reichsgericht that unconditionally supports the broad statement in the
text above. See 19 LEIPZIGER ZEITSCHRIFr 263 (1925); see also 54 JuRuSTIscHE WOCHENSCHRIFr
2608 (1925).
48. See 48 BGHZ 35, 43.
49. It was decided by the first-cited judgment of the Reichsgericht and by the Bundesgerichtshof
that the articles of incorporation or by-laws of an association may provide that any disputes arising
between the association and its members may be adjudicated by an arbitral tribunal. The members
of the association, thus, appear as third-party beneficiaries of the articles of association or of the
bylaws. See 108 RGZ 374, 48 BGHZ 35. Whereas these rulings seem to limit the application of the
third-party beneficiary construct to the association-member-relationship, German doctrinal writers-
in line with the two other decisions of the Reichsgericht cited supra in note 47-are of the opinion
that the construct of the third-party beneficiary is applicable to any arbitration agreement and to any
arbitrable legal relationship whatsoever. See, e.g., P. Schlosser, supra note 35, at 323; see also A.
SCHOTZE ET AL., HANDBUCH DES SCHIEDSVERFAHRENS 31 (2d ed., Berlin 1990); K.H. SCHWAB &
G. WALTER, SCHIEDSGERCHTSBARKEIT, SYSTEMATISCHER KOMMENTAR 62 (4th ed. 1990).
50. 1987 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 139.
51. See, e.g., J.L. Goutal, supra note 45.
52. Id. See also A. Chapelle, supra note 5, at 484-85.
53. See J.L. Goutal, supra note 45, at 141; see also A. Chapelle, supra note 3, at 161.
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companies, but also as to other companies whose directors have not signed the
agreement.
The rules of representation are not identical as between the different national
systems of law. Instead, they vary from legislation to legislation. Each arbitral
tribunal facing the problem whether a company nonsignatory to an arbitration
agreement is yet bound and entitled by it will have to determine on the basis of
a conflict of laws operation which national rule of representation it will apply.
This problem of conflict of laws cannot be dealt with in the present context.
Suffice it to say that, as a matter of rule, arbitral tribunals are not bound by specific
rules of conflict of laws, but have discretion to apply the conflict of laws rules
they deem most appropriate under the specific circumstances of the case."
The first task of the arbitral tribunal will always be to determine which national
rules of representation are applicable in the context of the specific facts of a case.
However, the different national rules of representation commonly distinguish
between three kinds of representation.55
A company may, for example, by a power of authority under seal or in writing,
have been expressly authorized to bind and entitle with its signature to an arbitra-
tion agreement not only itself, but also its parent company, its individual owner,
its subsidiary or sub-subsidiary, or any other affiliated company. When attaching
its signature to the arbitration agreement, it may expressly refer to such power
of authority, and thus, undoubtedly act also on behalf of and in the name of the
principal. In cases of this kind the solution to our problem is very simple: not only
is the company signatory to the arbitration agreement bound and entitled by the
agreement, but also the principal on whose behalf and in whose name the company
attached its signature.
It seems to be universally recognized, however, that powers of authority cannot
only be granted and that the agent may not only act on behalf of and in the name
of its principal in one of the express manners just cited; but also that the principal
and agent may disclose their intention to confer power of authority to act on behalf
of and in the name of the principal, in a tacit manner, that is by a conclusive
action.
The arbitral tribunal must be in a situation to infer from the surrounding facts
the power of the agent and the dealings of the agent on behalf of and in the name
of the principal. Although the power of authority and the agent's action on behalf
of and in the name of the principal did not materialize in any written document
or in any express oral declaration, it must be possible to conclusively derive such
power and such action from the facts surrounding the actions. The principal,
agent, and third party must know that the arbitration agreement, although signed
54. See supra part IV.B.
55. See W. Muiller-Freienfels, Law of Agency, 6 AM. J. COMP. L. 165, 173-76 (1957); see also
W. Muller-Freienfels, Legal Relations in the Law of Agency: Power of Agency and Commercial
Certainty, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 193, 203-06 (1964).
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only by the agent, extended its effects as between all three of them. In this set
of facts the extension of the effects of the arbitration agreement to the principal
is supported by the common intentions of all three parties.
Some of the above-cited cases in which the respective arbitral tribunals made
use of the group of companies theory56 could easily be solved with the help of the
doctrine of tacit representation. If some of the arbitral awards rendered under the
auspices of the ICC have stressed that the affiliated companies nonsignatories to
the arbitration agreement had participated in the conclusion, execution, termina-
tion, or renegotiation of the main contract and that they, therefore, must be held
to be bound by it, under certain circumstances it was superfluous for such tribunals
to develop a new group of companies theory. The normal rules of tacit representa-
tion would at least in some of the cases have been sufficient to solve the problem,
that is to bind the affiliated companies.57
A third category of rules of representation presumably may also be found in
all national systems of law. This category of rules may be summarized under the
title of apparent or constructive representation. Its distinctive feature is the ab-
sence of a real intention of the principal company to confer power of authority
upon an agent company and a similar absence of a real intention of the agent
company to act on behalf of and in the name of an affiliated company. Under the
specific circumstances of the case, however, a party may be estopped from alleg-
ing the lack of such power of authority and the lack of such action on behalf and
in the name of an affiliated company. I
This third category of cases requires a more detailed analysis, which follows.
VII. The Different National Rules of Estoppel
The rules of estoppel may be applicable in two different factual situations: (1)
a company may, without possessing any power of authority, have acted on behalf
of and in the name of an affiliated company or of its individual owner (part A);
or (2) an affiliated company, as well as the individual owner of a company,
may, when the company negotiated, performed, or terminated a contract signed
exclusively by the company, have posed as an additional party to the contract.
In such cases the affiliated company or the individual company of the owner may
be estopped from alleging that they are neither bound by the contract nor by the
arbitration clause contained therein.
56. See supra note 1.
57. See K.-H. B6ckstiegel, Abschluss von Schiedsvertrdgen durch konkludentes Handeln oder
Stillschweigen, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ARTHUR BOLow ZUM 80. GEBURTSTAG 1 (K.-H. B6ckstiegel &
0. Glossner eds., 1981) (referring to the formation, under German domestic law, of arbitration
agreements by way of tacit understandings).
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A. THE LACK OF A POWER OF AUTHORITY
As mentioned above, the institution of the apparent or constructive representa-
tion seems to be known to almost all national systems of law. In the present context
it cannot be proved that such rules may indeed be found in almost all national
legislations. But an attempt will be made to show how such rules operate in a few
national systems of law and to the results their application leads in the cases here
under consideration.
1. French Law
French law recognizes not only that a power of authority may be conferred in
a tacit manner by conclusive dealings between the parties, but that such power
may also be presumed to have existed although it has in fact never been issued,
neither expressly nor tacitly. Thus the famous doctrine of "mandat apparent"
is on point.
Under this doctrine a principal may be bound by the action of a person upon
whom it never conferred any power of authority if the apparent principal and the
apparent agent caused bona fide third parties to believe in the existence of the
power. The circumstances must reveal that the third parties with whom the appar-
ent agent dealt had good reasons to believe the agent was invested with an authori-
zation to deal on behalf of and in the name of the apparent principal. The reliance
interest of such third parties must outweigh the interest of the principal to invoke
the lack of any actual power of authority. Under such circumstances the apparent
principal is estopped from alleging the nonexistence of any power of authority.
Instead it is liable vis-A-vis the third persons for the compensation of any damages
sustained by them through their reliance on a power of authority that, in fact, did
not exist. The remedy that accrues to the third parties is a claim for restitutio in
intergrum, which leads in the present context to the fictional assumption that a
power of authority had indeed been conferred. The law implies a power of author-
ity, and the arbitration agreement binds the apparent principal although it never
attached its signature.58
Commentators have applied this doctrine of mandat apparent to solve the
58. See D. Alexandre, Mandat, Obligations du mandataire et du mandant, Effets ) l'dgard des
tiers, in JURIS-CLASSEUR CIVIL arts. 1991-2002, fasc. 2, mandat: fasc. G (8, 1989), Nos. 69-98, at
14-20; H. & L. MAZEAUD ET AL., LEONS DE DROIT CIVIL 854-56 (5th ed. 1980); P. Lescot, Le
mandat apparent, 1964 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, Doctrine 1826; 9 M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, TRAIT-
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS: CONTRATS CIViLS 949-51 (2d ed. 1954); J. Jdaut6, Le mandat
apparent dans ses rapports avec la thdorie gdndrale de l'apparence, 44 REVUE T.iMESTRIELLE
DE DROIT CIVIL 288-307 (1947); 3 DALLOZ, NOUVEAU RAPERTOIRE DE DROIT 20-21 (1949); P.J.
GOTTHARDT, DER VERTRAUENSSCHUTZ BEI DER ANSCHEINSVOLLMACHT IM DEUTSCHEN UND IM
FRANZ6SISCHEN RECHT (1970).
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problem here under consideration. 59 Indeed in at least one arbitral award 6° this
doctrine was applied by an arbitral tribunal proceeding under the Rules of Arbitra-
tion of the ICC.
2. English Law
The doctrine of "apparent" or "ostensible" representation is also known to
English law. It is based on the fact that the purported principal never issued to
its apparent agent a power of authority with respect to the transaction in question.
But,
the law treats their relationship as one of principal and agent, giving effect to their
conduct as if it amounted to the expression of consent that they should be principal and
agent ... [T]his form of agency may be regarded as a type of agency arising by operation
of law.6'
It is also called "agency by estoppel. '62
In an analysis of the rulings of English courts, G.H. Treite 63 has found the
following catalogue of conditions that must be satisfied before such apparent
authority may be assumed to exist:64 (1) There must be a representation of authority
by the principal to the third party, (2) which has to be a representation of fact (3)
that the agent is authorized to act as agent, and (4) the third party must have relied
on that representation. Similar catalogues of conditions have been set up by other
writers in an analysis of English common law. 65 This article later notes that
these catalogues are in a surprising manner in harmony with the requirements
established insofar by German law.
3. U.S. Laws
In the different jurisdictions of the United States, the pertinent laws seem to
be much more complicated. In the United States distinction is made between
"apparent authority" and "authority by estoppel." "Apparent authority" is
59. See P. Lagarde in a contribution to a discussion, in TRAVAUX 1984-1985, supra note 5, at
129; see also A. Chapelle, supra note 5, at 483; 1986 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE, supra note 3, at 110
(amotation to the Judgment of Oct. 21, 1983, rendered by the Cour d'Appel de Paris); P. Fouchard,
in a contribution to a scholarly discussion, 1988 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 500.
60. See ICC matter no. 5730, supra note 1, at 1036; see also A. Chapelle, supra note 5, at 483
(assuming also that the award of 1975 in the ICC matter no. 1434 is based on that doctrine, an
assumption which seems doubtful).
61. See G.H.L. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF AGENCY 97 (5th ed. 1983).
62. See id. ch. 6.
63. G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 615-19 (8th ed. 1991).
64. The author of the present article has rearranged Treitel's criteria, however, without altering
them.
65. See, e.g., FRIDMAN, supra note 6 1, at 99-103; see also F.M.B. REYNOLDS & B.J. DAVENPORT,
BOWSTEAD ON AGENCY 16-18 (14th ed. 1976); John N. Adams, Agency, in 1(2) HALSBURY's LAWS
OF ENGLAND 25, 26 (4th ed. 1990); John N. Adams, Estoppel, in 16 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND
1068-79 (4th ed. 1976) (under the title of: "Estoppel by Representation in General"); Richard T.H.
Stone, Usual and Ostensible Authority-One Concept or Two?, 1993 J. Bus. L. 325.
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defined by article 8 of the Restatement (Second) of the Law ofAgency66 as resulting
from a manifestation by a person that another is his agent, the manifestation
being made to a third person and not as when authority is created to the agent. 6
"Authority by estoppel," on the other hand, is defined by article 8B of the
Restatement as follows:
(1) A person who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction purported to be done
on his account, is nevertheless subject to liability to persons who have changed their
positions because of their belief that the transaction was entered into by or for him, if
(a) he intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, (b) knowing of such belief and that
others might change their positions because of it, he did not take reasonable steps to
notify them of the facts. 69
The astounding surprise to anybody who analyzes the state of the laws in the
different jurisdictions of the United States is that the doctrinal tools of "apparent
authority" and "authority by estoppel" have never been used by U.S. courts
when they have had to decide on the problems here under consideration. The
approach of U.S. courts to these problems has been quite different: while "appar-
ent authority" and "authority by estoppel" did not play any role whatsoever, the
alter ego doctrine (piercing the corporate veil) was implemented by U.S. courts
when solving these problems. 70 Such neglect of the doctrinal tools of "apparent
authority" and "authority by estoppel" is probably due to the fact that both
doctrines are too narrow to produce satisfactory results under these circumstances.
The conditions for their application are so strict that they would hardly ever permit
an affiliated company or the individual owner of a company to be held bound by
an arbitration agreement which they have not signed.7'
4. German Law
In German law, on the contrary, courts would have to make use of the concept
of "authority" or "representation by estoppel." In the context of representation
German courts have developed two different kinds of doctrine of estoppel: the
doctrine of the Duldungsvollmacht and the doctrine of the Anscheinsvollmacht.72
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY art. 8 (1958).
67. In terms of English and German law, under such circumstances there would not be "appar-
ent," but there would be "real" authority if these conditions would be satisfied. This "real" authority
would not stem from a communication between principal and agent, but from a communication
between principal and third party.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 66, art. 8(B).
69. The requirements to be met before the concept of "authority by estoppel" can be utilized
are aggravated by paragraph 3 of article 8(B) which reads: "(3) Change of position, as the phrase
is used in the restatement of this subject, indicates payment of money, expenditure of labor, suffering
a loss or subjection to legal liability." Id.
70. See infra part V.B.
71. See supra note 69.
72. On this topic, there is abundant literature. It will suffice here to cite a few general writings
which give further references. H. HOBNER, ALLGEMEINER TElL DES BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS
498-502 (1985); J.V. GIERKE & 0. SANDROCK, HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 364-70 (9th ed.
1975).
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Application of the doctrine of the Duldungsvollmacht requires the presence of
four different facts.73 First, somebody acts in the name of a purported principal
without having been authorized so to act. Second, the alleged principal notices
the action of the supposed agent, but does not intervene to stop it and lets the
purported agent have its way. Third, a bona fide third party, with whom the
supposed agent has dealt, relies on the existence of a power of authority. Finally,
the purported principal did in fact have the opportunity to prevent the supposed
agent's actions.
Under such circumstances the supposed agent indeed lacks authority to act on
behalf of and in the name of the purported principal. But the principal is estopped
from alleging the lack of such power of authority. 74
Instead the principal is bound by any commitment that the supposed agent has
assumed in the principal's name. When parties debate whether a signature attached
by one company member of a group of companies to an arbitration agreement
also binds and entitles the other members of such group, the doctrine of Duldungs-
vollmacht implies: if the member signatory to the arbitration agreement has posed
also as an agent for other members of such group, they will be bound and eventu-
ally also entitled by such action.
German courts have developed another doctrine of estoppel in the field of
representation, that of the Anscheinsvollmacht.
Application of this doctrine requires the presence of the following five sets of
facts. 75 First, somebody must have acted on behalf and in the name of a purported
principal without having been authorized so to act. Second, it is necessary, further-
more, that such action was not only temporary, but stretched over a certain period
of time (so that third parties could be induced into believing that there was a real
power of authority). Third, in contrast to what has been mentioned with the
Duldungsvollmacht, the alleged principal does not notice the action of the sup-
posed agent. Such unawareness is due, however, to negligence on the part of the
supposed principal. Fourth, a bona fide third party, with whom the supposed
agent has dealt, relies on the existence of a power of authority. It is, however,
not necessary that the false impression of the existence of a power of authority
has been created specifically with respect to the third person involved. It suffices
that such false impression has been made vis-A-vis the group to which the third
person belongs. Finally, similar to what has been explained in the context of the
Duldungsvollmacht, the purported principal did have the opportunity to prevent
the supposed agent's actions.
If these five sets of facts occur in a special case, German courts will assume
73. See GIERKE a SANDROCK, supra note 72, at 365.
74. This is the doctrine underlying the rulings of the German Supreme Court in Civil Matters
and advocated by some legal writers. In the opinion of the author of this article, the Duldungsvollmacht
is, however, an ill-conceived notion whose problems could be solved more easily and much better
by the application of the rules on a tacitly conferred power of authority.
75. See Gtaiuc a SANDROCK, supra note 72, at 366.
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the existence of an apparent power of authority. The purported principal is bound,
and possibly also entitled, by the action of the supposed agent. In the context of
the current problem, if a company member of a group of companies has attached
its signature to an arbitration agreement posing, at the same time, as an agent of
one or several affiliated companies or of the individual owner of the group, these
third persons will be bound and possibly also entitled by the agreement.
In summary, therefore, German courts may not expressly use a doctrine of
estoppel or the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil when dealing with the
problem here under consideration. But an obvious parallel exists between the
French doctrine of mandat apparent and the German doctrine of Duldungsvoll-
macht and Anscheinsvollmacht. And the doctrinal principles underlying the insti-
tutions of Duldungsvollmacht and Anscheinsvollmacht are nothing more than what
has been developed under the label of the doctrine of estoppel.
5. Swiss Law
Swiss law resembles German law. Although the Swiss Federal Supreme Court
has never made use of the notion of Duldungsvollmacht or Anscheinsvollmacht,
it has ruled in cases where the facts corresponded to those of the Duldungsvoll-
macht and Anscheinsvollmacht that the purported principal was bound by the
action of the person who posed as agent.76 Doctrinal writers expressly refer to the
two German doctrines, maintaining that what Swiss courts apply are more or less
the rules underlying the above-mentioned German doctrines. 7
B. THE NONSIGNATORY COMPANY HAS POSED AS A CONTRACTUAL PARTNER
As mentioned above,78 the doctrine of estoppel is applicable not only to cases
where a company, without possessing any power of authority, has acted on behalf
and in the name of an affiliated company or of its individual owner. It may also
be used in a different factual situation where an affiliated company or the individ-
ual owner of a company while not formally signing the arbitration agreement has
posed as a contractual partner. The pertinent national rules of estoppel applicable
under the conflict of laws rules 79 will then have to be determined for solving the
conflict between the interests of the nonsignatory company or individual owner
not to be bound by the agreement and the reliance interest of the third party
induced into believing that the company or owner was a party to the agreement.
Furthermore, this author has already pointed out ° that U.S. courts, when
76. See, e.g., the decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court of December 8th, 1970 (Verreyken
v. Parsel S.A.), Schweizerisches Bundesgericht [Supreme Court], 96 BGE 1 439, 442-43 (Switz.).
77. See T. GUHL, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE OBLIGATIONENRECHT 139-40 (7th ed. 1980); E.
BUCHER, SCHWEIZERISCHES OBuGATIONENRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TElL 558-60 (1979); A.V. TUHR
& H. PETER, ALLrEMEINER TEIL DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN OBLIGATIONENRECHTS 357-58 (3d ed. 1979).
78. See supra part VII.
79. See supra part IV.B.
80. Supra part VIII.A.3.
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confronted with the problems here under consideration, have only used the alter
ego doctrine or the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil,8' which are specimens
of the broader doctrine of estoppel (by matter in pais). In a decision regarded as
the leading case rendered in 196082 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit stated that a person who did not sign an arbitration agreement may
still become bound by the operation of general principles of contract law, 3 that
one set of those principles is contained in the alter ego doctrine, which provides
that "the corporation and those who have controlled it without regard to its
separate entity are treated as but one entity, and at least in the area of contracts,
the acts of one are the acts of all"; that the alter ego theory binds the parent which
as "puppeteer" has "directed his marionette" to sign; 4 and that, therefore, if
the parent is bound to the contract then like its subsidiary it is bound to submit
to arbitration.
8 5
In later decisions U.S. courts 6 have further specified the relevant criteria to
be satisfied before the alter ego doctrine may be applied.87
VIII. Conclusion
The preceding analysis has shown that detailed legal rules have developed on
a national level to deal with the problem here under consideration. These national
81. This surprising fact is explained by P.I. Blumberg, Corporate Groups and Enterprise Liabil-
ity, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 10-1, 10-15, 10-16 as follows: "inasmuch as common-law agency
requires a consensual understanding between the parties and requires the subsidiary to be acting on
behalf of the parent, not on its own behalf, common-law agency rarely exists in intragroup liability
cases." See also Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir.
1929) (opinion of Learned Hand, J.)
82. Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 233 (2d Cir. 1960).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 234.
85. Id. at 235.
86. See, e.g., McAllister Bros., Inc. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519, 523-24 (2d Cir. 1980);
Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1984); Barrowclough v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 938-39 (3d Cir. 1985); Coastal States Trading, Inc. v. Zenith
Navigation S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330, 336-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hidrocarburos y Derivados, C.A. v.
Lemos, 453 F. Supp. 160, 172-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co. v. Rosseel,
N.V., 609 F. Supp. 75, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Dighello v. Busconi, 673 F. Supp. 85, 88-90 (D. Conn.
1987).
87. These criteria have been enumerated in Flynt Distributing Co., Inc. v. Harvey as being the
following: "To apply the alter ego doctrine, the court must determine (1) that there is such unity of
interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individuals no longer
exist and (2) that failure to disregard the corporation would result in fraud or injustice." 734 F.2d
at 1393. One will also note that these criteria are very narrow. In an earlier decision the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York, in the matter of Coastal States Trading, Inc.
v. Zenith Navigation, S.A., had already elaborated a more specific criterion for the group of companies
situation by stating the following:
[A] party seeking .. to bind a corporation to an arbitration agreement to which it is not a signatory must...
establish that the subsidiary corporation was controlled to such a degree by the parent that it had "no separate mind,
will or existence of its own" Such control must go beyond mere stock ownership, or even identity of officers
and directors, to the point that the controlling corporation dominates the finances, policy, and business practices
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legal rules not only create legal certainty absent insofar with any rules of the lex
mercatoria, whose definite contours are vague and open to discussion. They also
satisfy the reliance interests of the parties that expect their business deals to be
judged by definite norms in no way subject to any discretion of the arbitrators,
a discretion that, if it existed, would seem to border on arbitrariness. Instead of
reverting to the lex mercatoria, arbitral tribunals should, therefore, determine the
applicable domestic proper laws on third-party beneficiaries, on representation,
and on estoppel, and therein search for the solution.
When advocating such a "conservative" solution, this author has in mind the
promotion of values, which, in the present context, have candidly been expressed
by M. Focsaneanu in the following contribution to a scholarly discussion:
I believe that we are playing a little bit with the fire. If one wishes that the institution
of arbitration is to live, it is necessary to respect the two legal pillars of that institution,
one of them being the acknowledgement of the distinct juristic personality of companies.
* . . If a counsel to multinational corporations would listen to our discussion, he would
be very worried because groups of companies have not been set up for mixing the group's
entities .... This is why I would prefer that we come back to ideas which are perhaps
a little bit old-fashioned, but which seem to me indispensable for a legal certainty if one
wants arbitration to remain viable."8
Another French lawyer was more explicit when he warned:
For ourselves, if one wants that arbitration continues to grow ... it is necessary above
all ... to desist from expanding its empire, by whatever means, to where the litigants
have not expressly made provision for. Thus, from all the reports, notably from the
contributions to the discussion made until now, it clearly results that, as it had already
been shown by Mr. Fadlallah during the works of the French Committee for arbitration
in 1985, "that it is necessary to avoid the creation of a presumption in favor of the
expansion of arbitration on a group, lest a feeling of rejection should be created suscepti-
ble of growing into a wholesale refusal of arbitration." . . . The tribunals should
understand this advice! 9
The goal of the foremost promotion of international commercial arbitration is,
indeed, best served when the application of uncertain theories, such as the lex
mercatoria, is avoided at least in this field where definite, time-tested national
rules are at hand. The traditional national rules on third-party beneficiaries, on
representation, and on estoppel are best apt to create legal certainty without which
the users of international arbitration might become afraid of turning to the best
procedural means of solving international business disputes-which indeed is
international commercial arbitration. 90
of the controlled corporation... The "'puppeteer" . . . must so thoroughly interpose itself into the conduct of
the controlled corporation that it can be said that the latter is merely a "screen" for the activities of the forner.
446 F. Supp. at 337.
88. See Fadlallah, supra note 5, at 127 [translation by the author].
89. J. Rubellin-Devichi, L'Arbitrage et les Tiers, III. Le Droit de l'Arbitrage, les Solutions
Juridictionnelles, 1988 REvUE DE L'ARBITRAoE 515 [translation by the author].
90. See A. Chapelle, supra note 5, at 496-98 (scholarly discussion following the presentation).
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